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ABSTRACT
During the first step of practical reasoning, i.e. deliberation, an intelligent agent generates a set
of pursuable goals and then selects which of them he commits to achieve. An intelligent agent
may in general generate multiple pursuable goals, which may be incompatible among them. In
this paper, we focus on the definition, identification and resolution of these incompatibilities. The
suggested approach considers the three forms of incompatibility introduced by Castelfranchi and
Paglieri, namely the terminal incompatibility, the instrumental or resources incompatibility and the
superfluity. We characterise computationally these forms of incompatibility by means of arguments
that represent the plans that allow an agent to achieve his goals. Thus, the incompatibility among
goals is defined based on the conflicts among their plans, which are represented by means of attacks
in an argumentation framework. We also work on the problem of goals selection; we propose to use
abstract argumentation theory to deal with this problem, i.e. by applying argumentation semantics.
We use a modified version of the “cleaner world” scenario in order to illustrate the performance of
our proposal.
Keywords Intelligent Agents · Goals Conflicts · Argumentation · Goals Incompatibility · Goal Selection · Practical
Reasoning
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1 Introduction
Practical reasoning means reasoning directed towards actions, i.e. it is the process of figuring out what to do. According
to [1], practical reasoning involves two phases: (i) deliberation, which is concerned with deciding what state of affairs an
agent wants to achieve, thus, the outputs of deliberation phase are goals the agent intends to pursue, and (ii) means-ends
reasoning, which is concerned with deciding how to achieve these states of affairs, thus, the outputs of means-ends
reasoning are plans. The first phase is also decomposed in two parts: (i) firstly, the agent generates a set of possible
goals, which we call pursuable goals1, and (ii) secondly, the agent chooses which goals he will be committed to bring
about.
This paper2 focuses on the process of goal selection; i.e. on deciding which consistent set of goals the agent will pursue.
We specifically deal with procedural goals3 and consider that the agents have limited resources, in other words, we
work with resource-bounded agents.
Given that an intelligent agent may generate multiple pursuable goals, some incompatibilities among these goals could
arise, in the sense that it is not possible to pursue them simultaneously. Thus, a rational agent should not simultaneously
pursue a goal g and a goal g′ if g prevents the achievement of g′, in other words, if they are inconsistent [3]. Reasons
for not pursuing some goals simultaneously are generally related to the fact that plans for reaching such goals may
block each other [6].
For a better illustration of the problem, let us present the following scenario. It is based on the well-know “cleaner
world” scenario, where a set of robots have the task of cleaning the dirt of an environment. The environment is divided
into numbered zones referenced by using ordered pairs, which facilitates the communication among the robots. The
main goal of all the robots is to have the environment clean. There can be two kinds of dirt, the liquid ones and the
solid ones, when it is liquid dirt, the agent mops it and when it is solid dirt, the agent picks it up. All of the robots are
equipped with a trash can with limited capacity and have the ability of cleaning both kinds of dirt. However, depending
on the distance between the agent and the dirt a robot can or cannot recognize the kind of dirt. In the environment, there
is also a workshop, where robots can go to be fixed or to recharge their batteries, and a waste bin, where robots carry
the trash they have picked up. During the execution of this task the agents may generate several pursuable goals, which
can originate some conflicts or incompatibilities among them.
According to Castelfranchi and Paglieri [7], three forms of incompatibility could emerge: terminal, instrumental and
superfluity. Let’s see an example of each kind of incompatibility based on our scenario:
• Terminal incompatibility: Suppose that at a given moment one of the robots – let us call him BOB – detects dirt
in slot (3,4); hence, the goal “cleaning slot (3,4)” becomes pursuable. On the other hand, BOB also detects
a minor technical defect in his antenna; hence, the goal “going to the workshop to be fixed” also becomes
pursuable. BOB cannot pursue both goals at the same time because the plans adopted for each goal lead to an
inconsistency, since he needs to be operative to clean slot (3,4) or become non-operative to go to the workshop
to be fixed.
• Instrumental or resource incompatibility: It arises because the agents have limited resources. Suppose that
BOB is in slot (1,4) and detects two dirty slots, slot (3,4) and slot (4,1). Therefore, goals “cleaning slot (3,4)”
and “cleaning slot (4,1)” become pursuable; however, he only has battery for executing the plan of one of the
goals. Consequently a conflict due to resource battery arises, and BOB has to choose which slot to clean.
• Superfluity: It occurs when the agent pursues two goals that lead to the same end. Suppose
that BOB is in slot (1,4). On one hand, he detects dirt in slot (5,5), since it is far from
its location, he cannot identify the kind of dirt; hence, the goal “cleaning slot (5,5)” becomes
pursuable. On the other hand, another cleaner robot – let us call him TOM – also detects the same dirty
slot and he also notes that it is liquid dirt; however, TOM’s battery is low and he is not able to do the task,
whereby he sends a message to BOB to mop slot (5,5); hence, the goal “mopping slot (5,5)” becomes pursuable.
It is easy to notice that both goals have the same end, which is that slot (5,5) be cleaned, with the difference
that “mopping slot (5,5)” is a more specific goal.
From these simple examples, one can observe that goals conflict emerge quite easily; hence, if conflicts arise an agent
should be able to choose which goals he will pursue, in other words, he should be able to deal with such conflicts or
1Pursuable goals are also known as desires and pursued goals as intentions. In this work, we consider that both are goals at
different stages of processing.
2This article is an extended version of the extended abstract originally presented at the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents
and MultiAgent Systems, AAMAS’17 [2].
3A goal is called procedural when there is a set of plans for achieving it. This differs from declarative ones, which are a description
of the state sought [3]. Other authors refer to this type of goal as achievement goal [4][5].
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incompatibilities. Besides, BDI-based agent4 programming languages should allow agent programmers to implement
agents that do not pursue incompatible goals simultaneously, and that can choose from possibly incompatible goals [10].
Therefore, the study of the possible forms of incompatibilities among goals will benefit both the theoretical research
and the practical applications.
The notion of conflicts is not something novel. Some researchers have focused on both the detection and the resolution
of conflicts, other ones only on the conflicts detection, and others on the resolution of emerging conflicts. Thangarajah
is one of the authors that has worked widely on this problem. In [11], he and his partners propose a general framework
for detection and resolution of conflicts; in [12], they focus on detecting and dealing with a special kind of conflict; and
finally, in [13], they focus on resolving resource conflicts. The deliberation strategy for choosing the goals the agent
will pursue is the concern of other researches (e.g., [14][15] [10] [16][17]). On the other hand, since this is a problem
directly related to agent programming languages, Zatelli et al. [17] present a summary of how some languages deal
with this problem. Thus, in some of these platforms, the programmer is in charge of specifying which goals must be
pursued atomically in order to avoid any kind of conflict with other goals (e.g., Jason [18], 2APL [19], and JIAC [20]).
Other platforms give more flexibility and allow that non-atomic goals be pursued at the same time with atomic goals
(e.g., N-2APL [21], AgentSpeak(RT) [22], and ALOO [23]).
Formal argumentation, or just argumentation, is an appropriate approach for reasoning with inconsistent (conflicting)
information [24]. Although argumentation has been usually used for formal reasoning5, there are some researches that
have applied it for practical reasoning for the generation of desires and plans (e.g., [25][26][27][28]). The process
of argumentation is based on the construction and the comparison of arguments (considering attacks or conflicts
among them) in order to determine the most acceptable of them. The classical form of attack is usually due to the
logical inconsistency between the elements that make up two arguments. However, in the resource incompatibility and
superfluity the conflict arises due to other reasons as it was presented in the above examples. Thus, we have identified
that in the context of practical reasoning, the meaning we give to the arguments and to the attacks can define new forms
of conflicts between arguments, which can also be supported by the argumentation inferences.
Against this background, the aim of this article is to study and formalize the aforementioned three forms of incompati-
bility, to show how to identify each of them taking into account the plans of the agent and how to deal with them. Our
proposal is based on argumentation-based reasoning, since it is a suitable approach for reasoning with inconsistent
information [24]. Thus, the research questions that are addressed in this paper are: (i) Can we identify when a kind of
incompatibility arises by using arguments that represent the plans of the agent? if so, how would it be done? and (ii)
faced with conflicting plans, how can the set of consistent goals be chosen?.
In addressing the first question, we start with a set of goals (possible incompatible) such that each goal has a preference
value and a set of plans that allow the agent to achieve it. We represent the agent’s plans by means of arguments and
define the kinds of attacks that determine the incompatibilities. Regarding the second question, we use argumentation
semantics in order to obtain a set of consistent goals (Figure 1 shows the workflow of the proposed argumentation-based
approach). In summary, the main theoretical contributions of this paper are:
• An arguments-based formalization of the three forms of incompatibility introduced by [7]. More specifically,
our contribution is on the formalization of the resource incompatibility and the superfluity because these
kinds of attacks has not been explored in the state of the art. It is specially in these kinds of attacks that the
intended meaning of the arguments in the context of practical reasoning becomes clearer and leads to a novel
characterization of attacks because these ones are not based on the evaluation of the inconsistency between
logical formulae but they extend the notion of attack.
• An argumentation-based approach for dealing with the incompatibilities that were identified. We provide two
ways for selecting the goals the agent will commit to pursue. The first one is based on the arguments generated
by the agent, and the second one is based on the set of pursuable goals. In order to identify the attacks between
pursuable goals, we base on the attacks identified between arguments. The proposed approach is an answer to
the need of a holistic approach that integrates and deals with more than one type of incompatibility. While it is
true that the attacks for determining resource incompatibility and superfluity are new in argumentation theory,
these types of conflicts have been already studied from other perspectives (see Related Work in Section 9);
however, different approaches to deal with each of them were employed.
• A theoretical study of the properties of this formalization; thus, we show that the results of this proposal satisfy
the rationality postulates determined in [29], namely consistency and completeness (closure).
4BDI is the acronym for Belief-Desire-Intention model [8] [9].
5Formal reasoning has to do with reasoning about propositional attitudes such as knowledge and beliefs.
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Generation of arguments
Identification of attacks
Determination of incompatibilities
Selection of compatible goals
Plans level
Plans level or
Goals level
Figure 1: General view of our argumentation-based approach. We can group the necessary steps in two levels, the
plans level and the goals level. The first three steps are exclusively done over a set of plans, which are represented
by means of arguments. Once the attacks among arguments are identified, they are used to determine which goals
are incompatible. Finally, argumentation semantics are then used in order to find the set of goals that can be pursued
without conflicts (final step).
This work has also a practical contribution since it can be applied to real engineering problems. As it can be seen in
the example, this kind of approach can be used in robotic applications (e.g., [30][31][32]) in order to endow a robot
with a system that allows him to recognize and decide about the goals he should pursue. Another possible application
is in the spatial planning problem, which aims to rearrange the spatial environment in order to meet the needs of a
society [33]. As space is a limited resource, it causes that the planner finds conflicts in the desires and expectations
about the spatial environment. These desires and expectation can be modeled as a set of restrictions and conditions,
which can be considered as goals (e.g., suitability, dependency, and compatibility)[34]. Thus, the planner can be seen as
a software agent that has to decide among a set of conflicting goals. Although these conflicting goals are not goals the
agent wants to achieve, as in the case of the robot, the agent may use this approach in order to resolve the problem
and suggest a possible arrangement of the spatial environment. It could also be applied during a design process, in
which inconsistencies among design objectives may arise and this results in design conflicts [35]. In this case, agents
may represent designers that share knowledge and have conflicting interests. This results in a distributed design system
that can be simulated as an Multi-Agent System [36][37]. This last type of application involves more than one agent;
however, since there is a conflict among goals, it can be resolved by applying the proposed approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section introduces basic concepts about the arguments on which
this approach is based. In Section 4, we define what kinds of attacks may occur between arguments, which will lead
to the identification of each form of incompatibility between goals. In Section 5, we delineate a set of properties
related to the attacks. This is important because it will allow us to use the concepts of abstract argumentation in our
approach. Section 6 is focused on the definition of argumentation frameworks, one for each kind of incompatibility and
a general argumentation framework. In Section 7, we study how to determine the set of compatible goals by means of
argumentation semantics applied to the argumentation frameworks. We present the evaluation of our proposal in terms
of fulfilling the postulates of rationality in Section 8. Finally, related work is discussed in Section 9 and the conclusions
and future work are presented in Section 10. All the proofs are given in an appendix at the end of the document.
2 Background
In this section, we will recall basic concepts related to the abstract argumentation framework (AF) developed by Dung
[24], including the notion of acceptability and the some semantics. The reader with previous knowledge on abstract
argumentation can skip reading this section. This section does not aim to be a tutorial on abstract argumentation.
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Definition 1 (Argumentation Framework) An argumentation framework AF is a tuple AF = 〈Arg,R〉 where Arg
is a finite set of arguments andR is a binary relationR⊆ Arg×Arg that represents the attack between two arguments
of Arg, so that (A,B) ∈ R denotes that the argument A attacks the argument B.
In argumentation theory, an acceptability semantics is a function in charge of returning sets of arguments called
extensions which are internally consistent. Next, we introduce the concepts of conflict-freeness, defense, admissibility
and the main semantics that we will later analyse in the Section 7 in order to determine which semantics (or family of
semantics) is the most adequate for the goals selection process.
Definition 2 (Basic concepts) Let AF = 〈Arg,R〉 an argumentation framework and a set E ⊆ Arg:
• E is conflict-free if ∀A,B ∈ E , (A,B) /∈ R.
• E defends an argument A iff for each argument B ∈ Arg, if (B,A), then there exist an argument C ∈ E such
that (C,B).
• E is admissible iff it is conflict-free and defends all its elements.
Next, we define preferred semantics. This semantics is based on the notion of admissibility and with the idea of
maximizing the accepted arguments. We have chosen this semantics because it can be considered a representative
semantics of the family of the admissibility-based semantics.
Definition 3 (Preferred semantics) Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈Arg,R〉 and a set E ⊆ Arg. E is a
preferred extension if it is a maximal (with respect to the set inclusion) admissible subset of Arg.
Unlike preferred semantics, stage semantics are not based on admissibility. The concept of stage semantics has been
introduced in [38] and further developed in [39] and, in essence, a stage extension is based on conflict-freeness6. We
have chosen this semantics in order to analyse semantics that are mainly based only on conflict-freeness and the range
concept. This semantics was also characterized in terms of 2-valued logical models in [40].
Definition 4 (Stage semantics) Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈Arg,R〉 and a set E ⊆ Arg, the range
of E is defined as E ∪ E+, where E+ = {A | A ∈ Arg and (B,A) ∈ R and B ∈ E}. E is a stage extension iff E is a
conflict-free set with maximal (with respect to inclusion) range7.
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present the main mental states of the agent and the representation of his plans by means of arguments,
which are called instrumental arguments.
We start by presenting the propositional logical language that will be used. Let L be a propositional language used to
represent the mental states of the agent, ` stands for the inference of classical propositional logic, > and ⊥ denote truth
and falsum respectively, and ≡ denotes classical equivalence. We use lowercase roman characters to denote atoms and
uppercase Greek characters to denote formulae, such that an atomic proposition b is a formula. If b is a formula, then so
is ¬b. If b and c are formulae, then so are b ∧ c, b ∨ c, and b→ c. Finally, if b is a formula, then so is (b).
From L, we can distinguish the following finite sets:
- The set B, which denotes the beliefs of the agent.
- The set G, which denotes the goals of the agent.
- The setRES , which denotes the resources of the agent.
- The set A, which denotes the actions of the agent.
B, G, RES , and A are subsets of literals8 from the language L. It also holds that B,G,RES , and A are pairwise
disjoint.
Example 1 Considering the scenario of the cleaner world and example given in the introduction, we next present some
possible beliefs, goals, resources, and actions of agent BOB:
6We call of conflict-free semantics to the semantics that is only based on the conflict-freeness concept.
7More details about this semantics can be found in [38].
8A literal is either an atomic formula or the negation of an atomic formula. When a literal is an atomic formula, we say that it is a
positive literal, and when a literal is the negation of an atomic formula, we say it is a negative literal.
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• Beliefs: there is solid dirt in slot (3,4), the trash can is full, and slot (1,2) is clean.
• Goals: clean a given slot, recharge battery, and clean the whole environment.
• Resources: battery, oil, and spare part.
• Actions: go to the next slot, use the spin mop to clean a given slot, and empty the trash can.
The agent is also equipped with a set of plans that allow him to achieve his goals. In order to analyze the possible
conflicts that may arise among goals, we express the agent’s plans in terms of arguments, which are called instrumental
arguments. The use of instrumental arguments for representing plans is not a novelty. Rahwan and Amgoud [28] define
this kind of argument, which is structured like a tree where the nodes are planning rules9 whose components are a set of
desires and a set of resources in the premise and a desire in the conclusion. Analogously, we use a set of goals and
resources in the premise (goals in the premise can be seen as sub-goals) and a goal in the conclusion. Additionally, we
also include a set of beliefs and a set of actions, because if the agent wants to achieve the goal in the conclusion of the
rule he needs that some beliefs are true and he also needs to be able to perform some actions. For example, for reaching
the goal “be fixed” it is necessary that a certain spare part is available. Thus, agent BOB needs that the belief “available
spare part” holds true in order to achieve “be fixed”. Regarding the actions, in order to achieve a goal it is necessary
that some actions be performed. For instance, for agent BOB clean all the environment it is necessary that he moves
from one slot to the next. Thus, in this work, a plan rule consists of a finite set of beliefs, a finite set of goals, a finite set
of actions, and a finite set of resources in its premise
It is also important to highlight that some of the sets of the premise of a plan rule may be empty. For example, not all of
the goals always have sub-goals because if it would happen, it would cause an infinite sequence of calls to sub-plans
and a top goal would never be reached.
These plan rules can be the result of an automated planner or can be obtained by gathering information from experts of
an application domain. For instance, in [41, 42], the authors propose an approach where fragments of human activities
are built from a set of observations (beliefs) of the world, a finite set of actions. We can compare a fragment of an
activity with an instrumental argument; hence, a fragment of activity defines a context of a given goal such as a plan
rule.
Regarding the resources in the premise of a plan rule, the necessary resource and its necessary amount
varies for each plan rule. Thus, let RESqua be an infinite set of ground atoms that denote a given
resource along with a given quantity, which is expressed numerically. Then, we have that RESqua =
{res_q(name, value)|res(name) ∈ RES , value ∈ N}. For example, assume that RES = {res(bat)}, where
bat is the name that denotes the resource battery. We may haveRES ′qua = {res_q(bat, 10), res_q(bat, 50)} such that
RES ′qua ⊂ RESqua and the ground atoms res_q(bat, 10) and res_q(bat, 50) denote that 10 units of battery and 50
units of battery are necessary, respectively.
Notice that we use the suffix res_q for denoting resources in RESqua and the suffix res for denoting resources in
RES .
Definition 5 (Plan rule) A plan rule pr is an expression of the form b1 ∧ ... ∧ bn ∧ g1 ∧ ... ∧ gm ∧ a1 ∧ ... ∧ al ∧
res_q(name, value)1 ∧ ... ∧ res_q(name, value)v → g, where bi ∈ B (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n), g, gj ∈ G, g 6= gj , (for
all 1 ≤ j ≤ m), ak ∈ A (for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l), and res_q(name, value)u ∈ RESqua (for all 1 ≤ u ≤ v).
It expresses that g can be achieved10 if beliefs b1 ∧ ... ∧ bn are true, sub-goals g1 ∧ ... ∧ gm can be achieved, actions
a1 ∧ ... ∧ al can be performed, and resources res_q(name, value)1 ∧ ... ∧ res_q(name, value)v are available. It is
important to state that the number of elements in the body of a plan rule is finite. Finally, let PR be the base containing
the set of plan rules.
Since there may be goals in the premise of a plan rule, this means that top goals (i.e. goals in the conclusion) may be
decomposed into sub-goals, which in turn can be decomposed into sub-sub-goals. Each of these sub-goals has also a
plan rule associated to it, which means that there is (at least) a plan rule for each goal.
9In this work, a plan rule is a building block structure that is used to construct a partial plan, which in turn is a building block that
is used to construct an instrumental argument. It is important to differentiate the plan rules used in this work with the plan rules used
in classical planning. In this work, the plan rules make up already defined plans, whereas the plan rules used in classical planning
support the generation of new plans.
10Achievement goals represent a desired state that an agent wants to reach [43].
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Example 2 Considering the scenario presented in the introduction section, let us introduce some examples of plan
rules. Suppose that the environment is a square of 5 × 5. For the environment to be completely clean, all the slots have
to be clean.
Let us present the beliefs, actions, goals, and resources that make part of the premises of the plan rules. The
beliefs the agent should hold are: has(spare_part),¬full_trashcan, solid_dirt(1, 1), ..., solid_dirt(5, 5),
liquid_dirt(1, 1), ..., liquid_dirt(5, 5), unknown_dirt(1, 1), unknown_dirt(1, 2), ..., unknown_dirt(5, 5), and
be(operative). The actions the agent should perform are: go(1, 1), ..., go(5, 5), use(vacuum), use(spinmop), and
go(workshop). The goals the agent should achieve are: clean(1, 1), ..., clean(5, 5), clean,mop(1, 1), ...,mop(5, 5),
pickup(1, 1), ..., pickup(5, 5), be(in_workshop), and be(fixed). We use goal clean to refer to the environment
as a whole and we use goals clean(1, 1), ..., clean(5, 5) to refer to each slot of the environment. Thus, to
achieve the goal clean, all the dirty slots have to be cleaned. Lastly, the resources that have to be available are
res_q(bat, 40), res_q(bat, 80), res_q(bat, 70), and res_q(bat, 30). We assume that the agent needs 10 units of battery
to go from a slot to the next, 20 units of battery to use the vacuum, and 10 units of battery to use the mop.
(1) clean(1, 1) ∧ clean(1, 2) ∧ ... ∧ clean(5, 5)→ clean
(2) mop(1, 1)→ clean(1, 1), ...,mop(5, 5)→ clean(5, 5)
(3) pickup(1, 1)→ clean(1, 1), ..., pickup(5, 5)→ clean(5, 5)
(4) ¬solid_dirt(1, 1) ∧ ¬liquid_dirt(1, 1) ∧ ¬unknown_dirt(1, 1)→ clean(1, 1), ...,
¬solid_dirt(5, 5) ∧ ¬liquid_dirt(5, 5) ∧ ¬unknown_dirt(5, 5)→ clean(5, 5)
(5) has(spare_part) ∧ be(in_workshop)→ be(fixed)
(6) be(operative) ∧ ¬full_trashcan ∧ solid_dirt(3, 4) ∧ go(3, 4) ∧ use(vacuum)
∧at(1, 4) ∧ res_q(bat, 40)→ pickup(3, 4),
- be(operative) ∧ ¬full_trashcan ∧ solid_dirt(4, 1) ∧ go(4, 1) ∧ use(vacuum)
∧at(1, 4) ∧ res_q(bat, 80)→ pickup(4, 1)
- be(operative) ∧ ¬full_trashcan ∧ solid_dirt(5, 5) ∧ go(5, 5) ∧ use(vacuum)
∧at(1, 4) ∧ res_q(bat, 70)→ pickup(5, 5)
(7) be(operative) ∧ ¬full_trashcan ∧ liquid_dirt(5, 5) ∧ go(5, 5) ∧ use(spinmop)
∧at(1, 4) ∧ res_q(bat, 60)→ mop(5, 5)
(8) ¬be(operative) ∧ res_q(bat, 30) ∧ go(workshop)→ be(in_workshop)
The first plan rule is associated to the general goal of the agent; it is to have cleaned a given environment. The next three
plan rules are related to the type of dirt the robot has to clean or the absence of dirt. Plan rule number five expresses
what the robot needs in order to be fixed. The next two plan rules expresses what the robot needs in order to achieve
goals mopping and picking up dirt of a given slot. Plan rule eight expresses what is necessary for the robot get the
workshop, for the sake of simplicity, go(workshop) summarizes a set of actions (e.g. turn to the left, walk one slot,
etc.).
We can now define the architecture of an intelligent agent, which is an instantiation of BDI model.
Definition 6 (Agent) An intelligent agent is a tuple 〈KB,PR,Gp, PREF,RESsum〉 where:
• KB = B ∪A ∪RESqua is the knowledge base of the agent,
• PR is the set of plan rules,
• Gp ⊆ G is the set of pursuable goals11,
• PREF :G → [0, 1] is a function that returns the preference value of a given goal such that 0 stands for the
minimum preference value and 1 for the maximum one,
• RESsum ⊂ RESqua is a resource summary, which contains the information about the available amount of
every resource of the agent. We assume thatRESsum is normalised so that each resource appears exactly once
and that all the resources represented inRES have their corresponding available amount inRESsum. Let
ρ : RES → N a function that returns the currently available amount of a given resource; thus, ρ(res(name))
denotes the availability of resource res(name).
Based on his knowledge base KB and the set plan rules PR, the agent can build partial plans, which are the building
blocks of instrumental arguments, which in turn represent complete plans. The idea is that each element of a complete
11We do not consider any temporal information about the order in which the goals should be pursued or the time the goals have to
achieved.
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plan, namely a belief, an action, a resource, or a goal, is represented by a partial plan, which can be seen as a standard
argument, whose claim may be a belief, an action, a resource, or a goal.
Definition 7 (Partial plan) A partial plan pp is a pair of the form [H,ψ] where:
• ψ ∈ A and H = ∅, or
• ψ ∈ B and H = ∅, or
• ψ ∈ RESqua and H = ∅, or
• ψ ∈ G andH = {b1, ..., bn, g1, ..., gm, a1, ..., al, res_q(name, value)1, ..., res_q(name, value)v} such that
∃(b1∧ ...∧bn∧g1∧ ...∧gm∧a1∧ ...∧al∧res_q(name, value)1∧ ...∧res_q(name, value)v → ψ) ∈ PR
A partial plan [H,ψ] is called elementary when H = ∅. Let us call H the support of the partial plan and ψ its
conclusion. As for notation, HEAD(pp) = ψ and BODY(pp) = H denote the conclusion and support of the partial plan
[H,ψ], respectively.
Example 3 Let us express as partial plans some of the plan rules introduced by Example 2:
pp = [{¬be(operative), has(spare_part), be(in_workshop)}, be(fixed)]
pp′ = [{}, go(workshop)]
pp′′ = [{}, solid_dirt(3, 4)]
Partial plan pp has in its conclusion a goal, and the partial plans pp′ and pp′′ have an action and a belief, respectively.
Based on partial plans, we can now define instrumental arguments, which correspond to complete plans.
Definition 8 (Instrumental argument, or complete plan) An instrumental argument is a pair [T , g] such that g ∈ G,
and T is a finite tree such that:
• The root of the tree is a partial plan [H, g],
• A node [{b1∧ ...∧ bn∧ g1∧ ...∧ gm∧a1∧ ...∧al∧ res_q(name, value)1∧ ...∧ res_q(name, value)v}, h′]
has exactly (n + m + l + v) children [∅, b1], ..., [∅, bn], [H ′1, g1], ..., [H ′m, gm], [∅, a1], ..., [∅, al],
[∅, res_q(name, value)1], ..., [∅, res_q(name, value)v] where each [∅, bi] (1 ≤ i ≤ n), [H ′j , gj ] (1 ≤ j ≤
m), [∅, ak] (1 ≤ k ≤ l), [∅, res_q(name, value)u] (1 ≤ u ≤ v) is a partial plan,
• The leaves of the tree are elementary partial plans.
LetArg be the set of all instrumental arguments that can be built from the knowledge base of the agent. We assume that
each goal in G has at least one instrumental argument. We will use function SUPPORT(A) to return the set of partial
plans of T and CLAIM(A) to return the claim g of an instrumental argument A. We also use the following function to
return the set of arguments whose claim is a given goal: ARG(g) =
⋃{A|CLAIM(A) = g and A ∈ Arg}.
As we said before, instrumental arguments have been already employed for representing plans. We have defined an
intrumental argument in the same way as it is defined in [28], i.e., as a tree of partial plans. However, there are two
differences between our definition and the definition given in [28], which are mainly related to the elements of the
partial plans. Thus, in [28], the conclusions of elementary partial plans are only beliefs whereas according to our
definition, the elementary partial plans may have as conclusions beliefs, actions, or resources. The other difference is
related to the elements of the non-elementary partial plans. Since a non-elementary partial plan is built from a plan rule,
it may have in its premise actions and resources, besides beliefs and goals, which are the elements considered in [28].
Example 4 Figure 2 shows two instrumental arguments. Argument C represents a complete plan for goal clean(5, 5)
and argument D represents a complete plan for goal mop(5, 5). Notice that argument D is a sub-argument of C.
4 Attacks between Arguments
In this section, we focus on the identification of attacks among instrumental arguments, which will lead to the
identification of each form of incompatibility among goals. The kind of attack depends on the form of incompatibility.
We have identified one type of attack for each form of incompatibility. These conflicts between arguments are defined
overArg and are captured by the binary relationRx ⊆ Arg×Arg (for x ∈ {t, r, s}) where each sub-index denotes the
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C[{be(operative), ¬full_trashcan , liquid_dirt, go(5,5), 
[{}, liquid dirt]
[{mop(5.5)}, 
[{}, ¬full_trashcan]
[{}, be(operative)]
D
use(spinmop),at(1,4),res_q(bat,60)}, mop(5,5)]
[{}, use(spinmop)]
clean(5,5)]
[{}, go(5,5)]
[{}, res_q(bat,60)][{}, at(1,4)]
Figure 2: Instrumental arguments C and D for Example 4. Dashed-border squares represent the leaves of the three.
form of incompatibility. Thus, t denotes the attack for terminal incompatibility, r the attack for resource incompatibility,
and s the attack for superfluity. We denote with (A,B) the attack relation between arguments A and B. In other words,
if (A,B) ∈ Rx, it means that argument A attacks argument B.
4.1 Rebuttal between partial-plans
We can define the terminal incompatibility in terms of attacks among instrumental arguments. In this attack, the beliefs,
the goals, and the actions of each partial plan of an argument are taken into account. Thus, an instrumental argument A
attacks another instrumental argument B when the conclusion of a partial plan of A is the negation of the conclusion of
a partial plan of B and both arguments correspond to plans that allow to achieve different goals. It is important to make
two remarks: (i) the nature of the two conclusions has to be the same, i.e. both conclusions have to be or beliefs, or
actions, or goals, and (ii) resources are not taken into account in this conflict. Formally:
Definition 9 (Partial-plans rebuttal -Rt) Let A,B ∈ Arg be two arguments, [H,ψ] ∈ SUPPORT(A) and [H ′, ψ′] ∈
SUPPORT(B) be two partial plans. We say that (A,B) ∈ Rt occurs when:
• CLAIM(A) 6= CLAIM(B),
• ψ = ¬ψ′ such that ψ,ψ′ ∈ B or ψ,ψ′ ∈ A, or ψ,ψ′ ∈ G.
We can observe thatRt is symmetric.
Proposition 1 If (A,B) ∈ Rt, then (B,A) ∈ Rt.
Example 5 Let Gp = {clean(5, 5), be(fixed)} be two pursuable goals of robot BOB. Figure 3 shows
argument A for goal clean(5, 5) and argument B for goal be(fixed). Consider also argument C,
of Figure 2, for goal clean(5, 5). We can observe three sub-arguments: E, whose claim is goal
pickup(5, 5), is the sub-argument of A, H , whose claim is be(in_workshop), is the sub-argument of B,
and D, whose claim is goal mop(5, 5), is the sub-argument of C. From these arguments, the partial-
plans rebuttals that can be identified are: Rt = {(A,B), (B,A), (E,B), (B,E), (E,H), (H,E), (A,H),
(H,A), (C,B), (B,C), (D,B), (B,D), (D,H), (H,D), (C,H), (H,C)}.
4.2 Attack for identifying the resources incompatibility
Two arguments are incompatible due to resources because the agent has no enough resources for performing the plans
represented by both arguments. Thus, the attack due to resources between two arguments has to reflect this fact. In order
to deal with resource conflict, we first define a resource consumption inference that works exclusively for reasoning
about resources. This inference considers the availability of a given resource and the amount of it that is necessary.
Recall that function ρ –introduced in Definition 6– returns the available amount of a given resource; however, the
necessary amount has to be obtained from the two arguments whose resource incompatibility is being evaluated. The
following steps are carried out in order to obtain this value.
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[{}, solid(5,5)][{}, ¬full_trashcan]
[{be(operative),¬full_trashcan , solid(5,5) , go(5,5), use(
[{pick_up(5,5)}, 
[{}, be(operative)]
EA
[{has(spare_part,) be(in_workshop
[{}, ¬be(operative)]
B
[{¬be(operative), 
[{}, has(spare_part)]
H
[{}, go(5,5)]
vacuum), at(1,4),res_q(bat,70)}, pickup(5,5)]
[{}, use(vacuum)]
clean(5,5)]
[{}, res_q(bat,70)]
[{}, at(1,4)]
)}, be(fixed)]
res_q(bat,30), go(workshop)}, be(in_workshop)]
[{}, res_q(bat,30)] [{}, go(workshop)]
Figure 3: Arguments A,E,H , and B for Example 5. There is a partial-plans rebuttal between arguments A and B,
A, and H , E and B, and E and H . The double-border squares highlight the conflicting partial plans. Dashed-border
squares represent the leaves of the three.
1. First of all, we put together all the same necessary resources of the two arguments in a formula (let us
call it Φres(name)). This means that there is a different Φres(name) for each different resource that both
arguments need. Thus, the formula Φres(name) is a conjunction of atoms that represent a resource and the
necessary amount of it. Such atoms are part of one or more plan rules that make up the two arguments.
Hence, we have that Φres(name) =
∧
res_q(name, value) where res_q(name, value) ∈ RESqua. For
example, argument A needs 70 units of battery and argument B needs 30 units of battery; hence, Φres(bat) =
res_q(bat, 70) ∧ res_q(bat, 30).
2. The second step is related to the signature of Φres(name). Let us denote the signature of Φres(name) by
LΦres(name) . Continuing with the example, LΦres(bat) = {res_q(bat, 70), res_q(bat, 30)}.
3. Finally, we can sum up the necessary amount of a given resource: pi(LΦres(name)) =∑
[res_q(name,value)∈LΦres(name) ] value. Finalizing the example, we have that pi(LΦres(bat)) = 100.
Once we have the available amount and the necessary amount of a given resource, we can define the resource-
consumption inference. This type of inference resembles other consumption inferences introduced by other consumption
and production resources logics like [44].
Definition 10 (Resource-consumption inference - `r) LetRESsum be the set of available resources of the agent and
Φres(name) be a conjunction of atoms such that LΦres(name) ⊂ RESqua. RESsum satisfies a formula Φres(name)
(denoted byRESsum `r Φres(name)) when ρ(res(name)) ≥ pi(LΦres(name)).
The following notation will be used for defining the resource attack. REC(A) denotes the set of resources necessary for
an argument A:
REC(A) =
⋃
pp∈SUPPORT(A) BODY(pp) ∩RESqua
Definition 11 (Resource attack -Rr) Let A,B ∈ Arg be two instrumental arguments, REC(A) be the set of resources
necessary for argument A, and REC(B) be the set of resources necessary for argument B. We say that (A,B) ∈ Rr
occurs when:
• ∃res(name) ∈ RES such that ∃res_q(name, value) ∈ REC(A) and ∃res_q(name, value)′ ∈ REC(B),
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• Φres(name) =
∧
[res_q(name,value)∈REC(A),res_q(name,value)′∈REC(B)] res_q(name, value)
∧ res_q(name, value)′,
• RESsum 0r Φres(name), this means that Φres(name) is resource-inconsistent.
We can see thatRr is symmetric.
Proposition 2 If (A,B) ∈ Rr, then (B,A) ∈ Rr.
Example 6 Let us recall that Gp = {clean(5, 5), be(fixed)} are the two pursuable goals of agent
BOB. Figures 2 and 3 show arguments C,A and B. Notice that argument C needs 60 units
of battery (res_q(bat, 60)), argument A needs 70 units of battery (res_q(bat, 70)), and argument B
needs 30 units of battery (res_q(bat, 30)). Recall that RESsum = {res_q(bat, 90), res_q(oil, 50),
res_q(fuel, 20)}.
Notice that for achieving goal clean(5, 5), there are two arguments with different needs of battery namely C and A,
and for achieving goal be(fixed) there is only one argument namely B. Considering arguments C and B, we have
Φres(bat) = res_q(bat, 60) ∧ res_q(bat, 30), in this case we can say that RESsum `r Φres(bat) because the agent
has enough resources for performing both plans. Otherwise, considering arguments A and B, we have Φ′res(bat) =
res_q(bat, 70)∧ res_q(bat, 30), in this case we can say thatRESsum 0r Φ′res(bat) because there is no enough energy
for performing both plans. Note that Φ′res(bat) is the same for arguments E and B; therefore, we can say that exists
resource attack between A and B, and also between E and B. The same reasoning applies to arguments A and H
and E and H . Thus, we have the following attack relations: Rr = {(A,B), (B,A), (E,B), (B,E), (A,H), (H,A),
(E,H), (H,E)}.
4.3 Superfluous conflict
Superfluity emerges when two plans lead the agent to the same end, in other words, when two arguments have the same
claim. Unlike other contexts, in practical reasoning the fact that two arguments support the same claim is considered
unnecessary, or even worse, a waste of time or resources, because it means that the agent performs two plans when only
one is necessary for achieving a given goal. Superfluity can be defined in terms of non-elementary partial plans, i.e.
in terms of partial plans whose conclusions are goals. Before presenting the definition of superfluous attack, we will
analize the following situations:
• Consider argument C (Figure 2) and argument A (Figure 3). Both arguments have the same claim but different
supports. This means that there is a superfluous attack between C and A.
• The above situation is the clearest way for identifying a superfluous attack. The question is: what happens
with the sub-arguments of C and A? If we have the set of arguments {C,A,D,E} and only there is a conflict
between C and A it means that the agent can perform, for example, the plans represented by arguments
C,D, and E, which means that the agent will perform two plans that lead to the same end because both D
and E allow the agent to achieve clean(5, 5). Therefore, there also should be a superfluous attack between
D and E. We can conclude that the sub-arguments of two arguments that attack each other by means of a
superfluous attack, also attack each other. Nevertheless, we noticed that there is an exception. Suppose that
both C and A have a sub-argument J , such that J is part of the three of C and is part of the three of A. If
all the sub-arguments of C attack all the sub-arguments of A, this means that D attacks J and E attacks J ,
which leads to an attack between two sub-arguments of the same three. Thus, we finally conclude that all the
sub-arguments of C should attack all the sub-arguments of A, except those ones that are the same in both
threes.
• We have analized the relation between the sub-arguments of C and A; however, we have not analized the
relation between C and the sub-arguments of A and vice-verse. The case is similar to the previous analyse.
Suppose that there is a superfluous attack between C and A and there are superfluous attacks between their
sub-arguments. This means that the agent could perform the plans represented by arguments C and E, which
is also a superfluous situation. Thus, we conclude that there should be also a superfluous attack between
argument C and the sub-arguments of A and vice-verse. In this case, we also consider the exception described
in the previous item.
Next, we present the definition of superfluous attack taking into consideration the previous analysis.
Definition 12 (Superfluous attack -Rs) Let A,B ∈ Arg be two arguments. We say that (A,B) ∈ Rs occurs when
either of the following cases hold:
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1. Case 1:
• CLAIM(A) = CLAIM(B),
• SUPPORT(A) 6= SUPPORT(B).
2. Case 2:
• CLAIM(A) 6= CLAIM(B),
• ∃A′, B′ ∈ Arg such that (A′, B′) ∈ Rs;
• [H ′′, CLAIM(A)] ∈ SUPPORT(A′) and [H ′′′, CLAIM(B)] ∈ SUPPORT(B′).
3. Case 3:
• CLAIM(A) 6= CLAIM(B),
• ∃A′ ∈ Arg such that (A′, B) ∈ Rs;
• [H ′′, CLAIM(A)] ∈ SUPPORT(A′),
• [H ′′, CLAIM(A)] /∈ SUPPORT(B).
When there is a superfluous attack between two arguments, we say that the goals in their conclusions are superfluous
conflicting goals. Lastly, relationRs is symmetric.
Proposition 3 If (A,B) ∈ Rs, then (B,A) ∈ Rs.
Example 7 Consider arguments A,B,H and E (Figure 3), arguments C and D (Figure 2) and argument F (Fig-
ure 4). Arguments C and A and arguments B and F have the same claim namely clean(5, 5) and be(fixed),
respectively. Hence there is a superfluous attack between C and A and between B and F . According to the
definition of superfluous attack, this is extended to the sub-arguments of these arguments. Thus, we have that
Rs = {(C,A), (A,C), (E,D), (D,E), (C,E), (E,C), (A,D), (D,A), (F,B), (B,F ), (F,H), (H,F )}. The at-
tacks that emerge due to Case 1 are: (C,A), (A,C), (F,B), (B,F ), the attacks that emerge due to Case 2 are:
(E,D), (D,E), and the attacks that emerge due to Case 3 are: (C,E), (E,C), (A,D), (D,A), (F,H), (H,F ).
[{has(spare_part), 
[{}, has(spare_part)]
F
support_pos(5,5)}, be(fixed)]
[{}, support_pos(5,5)]
Figure 4: Argument F for Example 7. Dotted-border squares represent the leaves of the three.
5 Postulates concerning Attack Relations
In this section, we study a set of properties that are relevant for the attack relations defined in Section 4. These are
based on the postulates presented by Gorogiannis and Hunter [45], which describe desirable properties of the different
kinds of attacks that may occur between logical arguments12. In this work, we have proposed three kinds of attacks –
related to the instrumental arguments – and these properties are important to guarantee that our approach can be seen as
an instance of the abstract argumentation and; therefore, it will benefit from the techniques of abstract argumentation
frameworks, explicitly for be able to employ abstract argumentation semantics.
We begin defining the concept of equivalence because it is essential for the understanding most of the properties. We
consider three types of equivalence: (i) the logical one, that takes into account the logical structure of the arguments, (ii)
the resource equivalence, that considers only the resources, and (iii) the whole equivalence, that takes into account both
the logical structure and the resources of an argument.
12You can find the definitions of the main kinds of attacks in [46].
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Definition 13 (Logical equivalence ≡l) Two instrumental arguments A and B are logically equivalent when (i)
CLAIM(A) = CLAIM(B) and (ii) SUPPORT(A) ` CLAIM(B) and SUPPORT(B) ` CLAIM(A) . We denote the logical
equivalence by A ≡l B.
In this approach, we can compare two arguments from the point of view of their logical structure or from the point of
view of resources necessary for performing the plans represented by the arguments. Next definition states when two
arguments are equivalent taking into account their resources.
Definition 14 (Resource equivalence ≡r) Two instrumental arguments A and B are equivalent by resources if
REC(A) = REC(B). We denote the resource equivalence by A ≡r B.
The whole equivalence is defined over the logical equivalence and the resource equivalence definitions.
Definition 15 (Whole equivalence ≡w) Two instrumental arguments A and B are wholly equivalent if (i) they are
logically equivalent and (ii) they are equivalent by resources. We denote the whole equivalence by A ≡w B.
From now on, A, B, C and their primed versions will stand for arguments. Let us recall thatRt,Rr, andRs stands for
the partial-plans rebuttal, the resource attack, and the superfluous attack, respectively.
The next six propositions take into account the notion of equivalence to identify attacks that originate due to the
equivalent arguments. Proposition 4 holds for the partial-plans rebuttal and the superfluous attack, in which only the
logical part of the argument is evaluated; therefore, it does not hold for the resource attack. Otherwise, Proposition
5 holds for resource attack and Proposition 6 holds for any of the types of attacks between arguments. Proposition 7
mandates that if there is a resource attack between an argument A and another argument B then there is a resource
attack between B and all arguments that are resource equivalent with A. In a similar way, Proposition 8 mandates
that if there is a partial-plans rebuttal or superfluous attack between arguments A and B then there is a partial-plans
rebuttal or superfluous attack, respectively, between B and all arguments that are logically equivalent with A. Lastly,
Proposition 9 states that if there is a partial-plan (resource or superfluous) attack between arguments A and B then there
is a partial-plan (resource or superfluous) attack between B and all arguments that are wholly equivalent with A.
Proposition 4 If A ≡l A′ and B ≡l B′ then (A,B) ∈ Rx = (A′, B′) ∈ Rx (for x ∈ {t, s}).
Proposition 5 If A ≡r A′ and B ≡r B′ then (A,B) ∈ Rr = (A′, B′) ∈ Rr.
Proposition 6 If A ≡w A′ and B ≡w B′ then (A,B) ∈ Rx=(A′, B′) ∈ Rx (for x ∈ {t, s, r}).
Proposition 7 If (A,B) ∈ Rr and A ≡r A′ then (A′, B) ∈ Rr.
Proposition 8 If (A,B) ∈ Rx and A ≡l A′ then (A′, B) ∈ Rx (for x ∈ {t, s}).
Proposition 9 If (A,B) ∈ Rx and A ≡w A′ then (A′, B) ∈ Rx, for x ∈ {t, r, s}.
The following proposition holds for the partial-plans rebuttal. It means that when two partial plans of different
instrumental arguments have an inconsistency in their heads, then both arguments attack each other. Notice that this
postulate is only related to partial-plan attack.
Proposition 10 If (A,B) ∈ Rt, then ∃[H,ψ] ∈ SUPPORT(A) and ∃[H ′, ψ′] ∈ SUPPORT(B) such that HEAD([H,ψ])∪
HEAD([H ′, ψ′]) `⊥.
6 Argumentation Frameworks
In this section, we present an argumentation framework for each kind of incompatibility (i.e., terminal, resource, and
superfluity) and a general argumentation framework that involves all the of arguments and attacks of the three kinds of
incompatibility.
Definition 16 (Argumentation framework) Let Arg be the set of arguments that can be built from the agent’s KB.
• A x-AF is a pair AFx = 〈Argx,Rx〉 (for x ∈ {t, r, s}) where Argx ⊆ Arg andRx is the binary relation
in Argx.
• A general g-AF is a pair AFg = 〈Arg,Rg〉, whereRg = Rt ∪Rr ∪Rs.
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Notice that it may occur that there exist the three kinds of attacks between two arguments. In this case, we consider
multiple attacks between two arguments as a unique general attack.
Example 8 Considering the arguments and attacks of the three kinds of incompatibility, we have the following g-AF:
AFg = 〈{A,B,C,D,E, F,H}, {(A,B), (B,A), (E,B), (B,E), (E,H), (H,E), (A,H), (H,A), (C,B), (B,C),
(D,B), (B,D), (D,H), (H,D), (C,H), (H,C), (C,A), (A,C), (E,D), (D,E), (C,E), (E,C), (A,D), (D,A),
(F,B), (B,F ), (F,H), (H,F )}〉. Figure 5 show the graph representation of this framework, where nodes represent
the arguments and edges the attacks.
A
C
F
clean(5,5)
clean(5,5)
mop(5,5)
pickup(5,5)
be(fixed)
B
E
D
H
be(fixed)
be(in_workshop)
Figure 5: The general argumentation framework AFg for Example 8. The nodes represent the arguments that are part
of AFg and the arrows represent the attacks between the arguments. The text next to each node indicates the claim of
each argument.
Hitherto, we have considered that all attacks are symmetrical. However, as mentioned in the introduction section and in
Section 3, goals have a preference value, which indicates how valuable each goal is for the agent. Since plans allow the
agent to achieve his goals, we can say that they can inherit the preference value of the corresponding goal. In other
words, instrumental arguments inherit the preference value of the goal in their claims. Therefore, depending on this
preference value, which is returned by function PREF, some attacks may be considered successful. This means that the
symmetry of the relation attack may be broken.
Definition 17 (Successful attack)13 Let A,B ∈ Arg be two arguments, we say that A successfully attacks B when
(A,B) ∈ Rg and PREF(CLAIM(A)) > PREF(CLAIM(B)).
Let us denote with AF ′g the general argumentation framework that results after considering the successful attacks.
Example 9 (Cont. Example 8) Consider the following preference values for the goals that are the claims of the ar-
guments: PREF(clean(5, 5)) = 0.75, PREF(be(fixed)) = 0.6, PREF(mop(5, 5)) = 0.8, PREF(pickup(5, 5)) = 0.75,
and PREF(be(in_workshop)) = 0.6. The general AF after considering the successful attacks is AF ′g =
〈{A,B,C,D,E, F,H}, {(A,B), (E,B), (E,H), (A,H), (C,B), (D,B), (D,H), (C,H), (C,A), (A,C), (D,E),
(C,E), (E,C), (D,A), (F,B), (B,F ), (F,H), (H,F )}〉. Figure 6 shows the graphical representation of AF ′g .
7 Selection of Compatible Goals
In this section, we use the general argumentation framework AF ′g, which takes into account the successful attacks,
in order to select those goals that can be considered compatible. While it is true that we defined an AF for each form
13In other works, it is called a defeat relation [47] [48].
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A
B
E
C
F
D
H
clean(5,5)
0.75
clean(5,5)
0.75
mop(5,5)
0.8
pickup(5,5)
0.75
be(fixed)
0.6
be(fixed)
0.6
be(in_workshop)
0.6
Figure 6: The general argumentation framework AF ′g after considering the preference value. Dashed-line arrows
represent the successful attacks. Next to each node there is information about the claim of the argument and the
preference value of it.
incompatibility, we will use the general AF because it includes all the kinds of attacks that exist between the arguments
and this is important for a proper identification of incompatible goals. However, depending on the application or the
interests of the agent, he could use one or two incompatibility AF instead of the general one. The process of selection
will be the same for any case.
Argumentation is related to non-monotonic reasoning. This reasoning allows to retract the inferences based on new
information. This kind of reasoning is important in the context of goal reasoning because new information about the
plans can change the attack relation and therefore the set of compatible goals. Additionaly, for the selection of the
compatible goals we use the so called argumentation semantics [24], which are ideal to determine non-conflicting
elements out of a set of conflicting ones without considering the nature of the conflict. In this work, we have formalized
three types of incompatibilities of different nature. Related work has also deal with these incompatibilities, but in a
separate way, that is, by means of different approaches (see Related Work in Section 9). Therefore, there is a need of
a unique approach that integrates and resolves the different types of incompatibilities, and we can do that by using
argumentation semantics.
We propose to apply argumentation semantics in two different ways: (i) we apply a semantics on the instrumental
arguments and the attacks that belong to the general AF, and (ii) we apply a semantics on a new argumentation
framework that is made up of pursuable goals and the attacks between them. This argumentation framework results by
identifying when two goals are incompatible from the general AF.
7.1 Semantics for the selection process
So far we have defined instrumental arguments, which represent plans, and we have introduced the kinds of attacks that
determine each form of incompatibility. The next step is to determine the set of goals that can be executed without
conflicts, which can also be called acceptable goals. This will be done by applying argumentation semantics. Let us
present an empirical analysis that allows us to determine what argumentation semantics concepts should be taken into
account.
For this analysis, we will use a simpler AF than the one that has been generated throughout the article. Figure 7(a) shows
the general AF generated for goals g1 and g2 and Figure 7(b) shows the general AF after considering the successful
attacks. Goal g1 is the claim of arguments I, J, and K, and goal g2 is the claim of arguments M and N . Note that
there is no sub-arguments in this structure.
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g1
I
J
K
M
N
g2
(a)
g1
PREF=0.85
I
J
K
M
N
g2
PREF=0.7
(b)
Figure 7: (a) The general argumentation framework before considering the successful attacks. (b) The general argumen-
tation framework after considering the successful attacks. Notice that the attack relation is no longer symmetrical.
1. Consider Figure 7(b). Under the preferred semantics (i.e. an admissibility-based semantics) and the stage
semantics (i.e. a semantics based on conflict-freeness and the range notion), the returned set is {I, J,K}. This
would mean that the selected goal is g1; however, this is not proper14.
2. Consider now Figure 7(a). Under the preferred and the stage semantics, we obtain
{I, J,K}, {I,K,N}, {J,M}, {M,N}. The question is: which of these extensions determines the
selected goals? If we take {I, J,K} or {M,N}, it would mean that only one of the goals will be selected. On
the other hand, if we take {I,K,N} or {J,M}, it would mean that both goals will be selected. Therefore,
there should be a function that supports the agent to decide which extension to choose faced with more than
one extension.
In summary, we can observe that (i) when the notion of successful attacks is not considered, the semantics may not
return the proper extension (for the simpler example it was not returned) and (ii) when the notion of successful attacks
is considered, the semantics return at least one proper extension. In this last case, the agent has to choose an extension.
Regarding to the first analyzed situation, note that none of the semantics returns a proper extension for the simpler
example. However, if we only apply the conflict-free semantics, there are some proper extensions that contain arguments
associated to both goals. Based on this, we can also say that:
• The concept of defence is not necessary. Observe extension {I,N}, which is a proper extension. In this
extension, argument N is attacked by argument J and argument I does not defend it. Even so, this extension
continuous being proper. It does not mean that there could be cases in which arguments of an extension defend
other arguments; however, it is not determinant.
• The number of elements of an extension does not determine the number of compatible goals. For example,
extension {I, J,K} has more elements than extension {I,N}, but the last one leads to obtain a set of two
compatible goals, and the first one contains arguments for only one goal. Hence, the conflict-free extensions
with more amount of elements does not always are the proper ones.
Now, the question is: which extensions can be considered the proper ones? There are two possible criteria for
determining it: (i) the maximum number of compatible pursuable goals and (ii) the maximum total preference value
taken into account only pursuable goals. Thus, the agent may choose whether he wants to commit to the maximum
number of pursuable goals or he wants to commit to those pursuable goals that maximize the preference value.
14{J,M} or {I,N} are conflict-free sets that can be considered proper extensions since they allow the agent to achieve both
goals g1 and g2. Thus, a conflict-free extension E is not proper with respect to other conflict-free extensions when there is at least
other conflict-free extension that allows the agent to achieve more goals than E .
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Thus, for determining the proper extension(s), we consider the following steps:
1. Apply the conflict-free semantics to the g-AF resultant after considering the successful attacks, i.e. to AF ′g .
2. If the agent wants first to maximize the number of compatible pursuable goals, the extension(s) that fulfils this
requisite should be selected. If there is more than one extension, then the agent should select the extension(s)
that maximizes the sum of the preference value of the goals.
3. If the agent wants first to maximize the total preference value, the extension(s) that fulfils this requisite should
be selected. If there is more than one extension, then the agent should select the extension(s) that maximizes
the number of compatible pursuable goals.
4. Finally, the agent selects those extensions that are maximal with respect to the set inclusion.
Definition 18 (Semantics functions) Given a general argumentation frameworkAF ′g = 〈Arg,Rg〉. Let SCF be a set
of conflict-free sets calculated from AF . The following functions are defined to determine the set of proper extensions:
• MAX_GOAL : SCF → 2SCF . This function takes as input a set of conflict-free sets and returns those sets with the
greatest number of pursuable goals. Sub-goals are not taken in to account in this function.
• MAX_UTIL : SCF → 2SCF . This function takes as input a set of conflict-free sets and returns those with the
maximum utility for the agent in terms of preference value. The utility of each extension is calculated by
summing up the preference value of all the goals, i.e. pursuable goals and sub-goals.
• COMP_GOALS : SpCF → 2Gp . This function takes as input a proper extension and returns a set of compatible
goals. Elements of SpCF are proper extensions that are returned by the application of the above functions.
Algorithm 1 shows the steps for determining the sets of compatible goals. The output of the algorithm is a set of sets
because more than one proper extension can be returned by the above functions. The algorithm includes the steps for
determining the set of proper extensions.
Algorithm 1 Steps for determining the sets of compatible goals
Input: The general argumentation framework AF ′g
Output: Sets of compatible goals Scomp
1: Scomp={}
2: /*————— Steps to determine the proper extensions —————*/
3: SCF = CONFLICT− FREE(AF ′g) //Function CONFLICT− FREE returns the conflict-free sets of an AF
4: if First maximize the number of compatible goals then
5: S ′CF = MAX_GOAL(SCF )
6: if |S ′CF | > 1 then
7: S ′′CF = MAX_UTIL(SCF ′)
8: end if
9: else if First maximize the total preference value then
10: S ′CF = MAX_UTIL(SCF )
11: if |S ′CF | > 1 then
12: S ′′CF = MAX_GOAL(SCF ′)
13: end if
14: end if
15: SpCF = MAXIMAL(S ′′CF ) //Function MAXIMAL returns the extensions that are maximal with respect to the set inclusion
16: /*——— End of the steps to determine the proper extensions ———*/
17: /*——— Final step to determine the sets of compatibles goals ———*/
18: n = |SpCF |
19: for count = 1 to n do
20: G ′p = COMP_GOALS(E ′count)
21: Scomp = Scomp ∪ G ′p
22: end for
23: return Scomp
Example 10 (Cont. Example 9) Recall thatAF ′g = 〈{A,B,C,D,E, F,H}, {(A,B), (E,B), (E,H), (A,H), (C,B),
(D,B), (D,H), (C,H), (C,A), (A,C), (D,E), (C,E), (E,C), (D,A), (F,B), (B,F ), (F,H), (H,F )}〉
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(Figure 6). Recall also that PREF(clean(5, 5)) = 0.75, PREF(be(fixed)) = 0.6,
PREF(mop(5, 5)) = 0.8, PREF(pickup(5, 5)) = 0.75, and PREF(be(in_workshop)) = 0.6. Table 1 shows
all the conflict-free sets SCF , the number of compatible pursuable goals of each set and the utility of each set.
EXTENSION NUM. GOALS UTILITY EXTENSION NUM. GOALS UTILITY
{} 0 0 {D,F} 1 1.4
{F} 1 0.6 {C} 1 0.75
{E} 0 0.75 {C,F} 2 1.35
{E,F} 1 1.35 {C,D} 1 1.55
{A} 1 0.75 {C,D, F} 2 2.15
{A,F} 2 1.35 {H} 0 0.6
{A,E} 1 0.75 {B} 1 0.6
{A,E, F} 2 2.1 {B,H} 1 1.2
{D} 0 0.8
Table 1: Conflict-free sets for Example 10. Column NUM. GOALS corresponds to the number of compatible pursuable goals
the plans (represented by arguments) of each extension allow to achieve. Column UTILITY shows the total preference
value summing up all the goals of the extension.
In this case, the decision of the agent about to first maximize the number of goals or first maximize the utility does not
affect the final result. Thus, MAX_GOAL ◦ MAX_UTIL(SCF ) = MAX_UTIL ◦ MAX_GOAL = {{C,D, F}}. This extension
projects three compatible goals, of which two are pursuable goals, with an utility of 2.15. Let’s see now the set of
projected compatible goals: COMP_GOALS({C,D, F}) = {clean(5, 5), be(fixed),mop(5, 5)}, where clean(5, 5) and
be(fixed) are pursuable goals and mop(5, 5) is the sub-goal of clean(5, 5).
Next example shows that the order of application of the semantics functions may affect the final result.
Example 11 Given a general argumentation frameworkAF ′′g = 〈{A,B,C}, {(A,B), (A,C)}〉. Goal g1 is the claim
of argument A, goal g2 is the claim of argument B, goal g3 is the claim of argument C. Consider PREF(g1) = 0.9,
PREF(g2) = 0.3, and PREF(g3) = 0.4. The set of conflict-free extensions is: SCF = {{}, {C}, {B}, {B,C}, {A}}.
Case the agent wants to first maximize the number of compatible goals, the result is: MAX_GOAL(SCF ) = {B,C}. Since
there is only one extension, there is no necessity of applying the function MAX_UTIL. Finally, COMP_GOALS({B,C}) =
{g2, g3}.
Case the agent wants to first maximize the utility, the result is: MAX_UTIL(SCF ) = {A}. Since there is only one
extension, there is no necessity of applying the function MAX_GOAL. In this case, the final set of compatible goals is:
COMP_GOALS({A}) = {g1}.
7.2 Selection at goals level
Another way to obtain the set of compatible goals is by generating a new argumentation framework whose elements
are goals. In order to generate this framework, we need to define when two goals attack each other. We make this
definition based on the general attack relation Rg, which includes the three kinds of attacks that may exist between
arguments. Thus, a goal g attacks another goal g′ when all the arguments for g have a general attack relation with all
the arguments for g′. This attack relation between goals is captured by the binary relationRG ⊆ G ′ × G ′ where, given
an AF ′g = 〈Arg,Rg〉, G ′ =
⋃
A∈Arg BODY(SUPPORT(A)) ∩ G, i.e. G ′ includes all the pursuable goals and all their
sub-goals. We denote with (g, g′) the attack relation between goals g and g′. In other words, if (g, g′) ∈ RG means
that goal g attacks goal g′.
Definition 19 (Attack between goals) Let AF ′g = 〈Arg,Rg〉 be a general AF, g, g′ ∈ G ′ be two goals,
ARG(g), ARG(g′) ⊆ Arg be the set of arguments for g and g′, respectively. Goal g attacks goal g′ when ∀A ∈ ARG(g)
and ∀A′ ∈ ARG(g′) it holds that (A,A′) ∈ Rg or (A′, A) ∈ Rg .
This definition states that although there are attack relations between arguments associated to different goals, if there is at
least two arguments (one for each goal) that do not have an attack relation, then the goals are considered non-conflicting
since there is a way of achieving them. Next proposition formalizes this idea.
Proposition 11 Let g, g′ ∈ G ′, ARG(g) and ARG(g′) be the sets of arguments whose claims are g and g′, respectively. If
∃A ∈ ARG(g) and ∃B ∈ ARG(g′) such that A and B are conflict-free, then (g, g′), (g′, g) 6∈ RG.
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It is important to notice that for defining the attack between goals the three kinds of attacks between arguments are
taken into account. This means that the attacks between arguments can complement each other to generate an attack
between goals. Let us explain it graphically. Consider Figure 8(a), suppose that black arrows represent partial-plan
rebuttals between goals g1 and g2. Taking into account these attacks between arguments, there is not an attack between
goals g1 and g2. Consider now Figure 8(b), besides the partial-plans rebuttal represented by black arrows, suppose that
green arrows represent resource attacks. Notice that in Figure 8(b), there is an attack between all the arguments for g1
and all the arguments for g2. In conclusion, we can say that an attack relation between two goals is possible even when
the attacks between their arguments are of different types. This means that the attack relation between goals generalizes
the attack between arguments.
I
J
K
M
N
g1 g2
(a)
g1
I
J
K
M
N
g2
(b)
Figure 8: (a) There is not an attack between goals g1 and g2, black arrows represent partial-plan rebuttals. (b) Dashed-
line arrows represent resource attacks. Notice that partial-plans rebuttal complements resource attacks. Therefore, there
is an attack between goals g1 and g2.
Now, we define the argumentation framework whose elements are goals. The attack relation between such goals is
ruled by Definition 19.
Definition 20 (Goals argumentation framework) An argumentation-like framework for dealing with incompatibility
between goals is a triple GAF = 〈G ′,RG, PREF〉, where:
• Gp is a set of the pursuable goals,
• RG ⊆ G ′ × G ′,
• PREF is the function that returns the value of a given goal for the agent.
The steps for obtaining the proper extensions can also be applied on this framework. However, the application of
function MAX_GOAL is different since it will return the extension(s) with the most amount of elements. Finally, function
COMP_GOALS is not necessary in this approach.
Example 12 Consider the final general AF of Example 9. AF ′g = 〈{A,B,C,D,E, F,H}, {(A,B), (E,B),
(E,H), (A,H), (C,B), (D,B), (D,H), (C,H), (C,A), (A,C), (D,E), (C,E), (E,C), (D,A), (F,B), (B,F ),
(F,H), (H,F )}〉. From AF the agent generates the following AF: GAF =
〈{clean(5, 5), pickup(5, 5),mop(5, 5), be(in_workshop), be(fixed)}, {(mop(5, 5), pickup(5, 5)), (clean(5, 5),
be(in_workshop)), (mop(5, 5), be(in_workshop)), (pickup(5, 5), be(in_workshop))}, {PREF(clean(5, 5)),
PREF(mop(5, 5)), PREF(pickup(5, 5)), PREF(be(in_workshop)), PREF(be(fixed))}〉 (Figure 9). Notice that
(clean(5, 5), be(in_workshop)) ∈ RG due to (A,H), (C,H) ∈ Rg, (mop(5, 5), pickup(5, 5)) ∈ RG due to
(D,E) ∈ Rg, (pickup(5, 5), be(in_workshop)) ∈ RG due to (E,H) ∈ Rg, and (mop(5, 5), be(in_workshop)) ∈
RG due to (D,H) ∈ Rg .
The number of conflict-free extensions is: |SCF | = 14. By applying MAX_GOAL, we obtain: MAX_GOAL(SCF ) =
{{clean(5, 5),mop(5, 5), be(fixed)}, {clean(5, 5), pickup(5, 5), be(fixed)}}. The total preference value of the
first extension is 2.15 and of the second one is 2.1. Thus, after applying MAX_UTIL, the selected extension is:
{clean(5, 5),mop(5, 5), be(fixed)}. This means that goals clean(5, 5), mop(5, 5), and be(fixed) are compatible
and con be executed without conflicts.
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clean(5,5)
mop(5,5)
be(in_workshop
PREF: 0.75
PREF: 0.8
PREF: 0.6
pickup(5,5)
be(fixed)
)
PREF: 0.75
PREF: 0.6
Figure 9: Graph of the goals argumentation framework of Example 12.
7.3 Discussion
Notice that according to the decision of the agent, he could use first MAX_GOAL and then MAX_UTIL or vice-versa. What
must be clear is that the first function to be applied takes as input all the conflict-free sets that are calculated from the
general AF and the second function takes as input the sets returned by the first function. Also notice that function
MAX_GOAL only takes into account pursuable goals, unlike function MAX_UTIL that takes into account all the goals of an
extension. In order to explain the reason we decided to restrict function MAX_GOAL to pursuable goals, let us present the
following situation: suppose that Gp = {g1, g2} is the set of pursuable goals and E1 = {A,B,C,D}, E2 = {E,F}
are the extensions returned by the conflict-free semantics. We have that ARG(g1) = {A,E}, ARG(g2) = {F}, and goals
B,C, and D are sub-goals of A. If we take into account all the goals in an extension, then we can say that E1 allows
the agent to achieve more amount of goals; however, only one of them is a pursuable goal. On the other hand, if we take
into account only pursuable goals, then we can say that E2 allows the agent to achieve two pursuable goals, i.e. more
pursuable goals than E1. We think that it is more important to maximize the amount of pursuable goals than the amount
of goals including sub-goals.
8 Evaluation of the Approach
In this section, we aim to study the properties of the proposed argumentation-based approach. We evaluate this approach
and prove that it satisfies the rationality postulates proposed in [29].
Firstly, let us define the following notation:
BEL(E) = ⋃A∈E (⋃pp∈SUPPORT(A)(BODY(pp) ∩ B))
ACT(E) = ⋃A∈E (⋃pp∈SUPPORT(A)(BODY(pp) ∩A))
GOA(E) = ⋃A∈E (⋃pp∈SUPPORT(A)(BODY(pp) ∩ G))
REC(E) = ⋃A∈E (⋃pp∈SUPPORT(A)(BODY(pp) ∩RESqua))
It is important to understand the following definition before presenting the results because both consistency and closure
are specified based on justified conclusions. A goal that is the conclusion of an argument in any extension can be
regarded as a justified conclusion, even if it is not in all extensions. From a more restrictive point of view, a goal can be
regarded as a justified conclusion when it is the conclusion of an argument that belongs to all the extensions.
Definition 21 (Justified conclusions) Let AF ′g = 〈Arg,Rg〉 be a general AF and after considering the successful
attacks {E1, ..., En} (n ≥ 1) be its set of extensions under the conflict-free semantics.
• CONCS(Ei) = {CLAIM(A)|A ∈ Ei}(1 ≤ i ≤ n).
• Output = ⋂i=1,...,n CONCS(Ei).
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CONCS(Ei) denotes the justified conclusions for a given extension Ei and Output denotes the conclusions that are
supported by at least one argument in each extension.
An important property required in [29] is direct consistency. An argumentation system satisfies direct consistency if its
set of justified conclusions and the different sets of conclusions corresponding to each extension are consistent. This
property is important in our approach because it guarantees that the agent will only pursue non-conflicting goals.
Theorem 1 (Direct consistency) Let AF ′g = 〈Arg,Rg〉 be a general AF after considering the successful attacks andE1, ..., En its conflict-free extensions. ∀Ei, i = 1, ..., n, it holds that:
1. The set of beliefs BEL(Ei) is a consistent set of literals.
2. The set of actions ACT(Ei) is a consistent set of literals.
3. The set of goals GOA(Ei) is a consistent set of literals.
4. The set of resources REC(E) is a resource-consistent subset ofRESqua.
5. The set of goals GOA(Ei) has no superfluous conflicting goals.
Next property is closure, the idea of closure is that the set of justified conclusions of every extension should be closed
under the set of plan rules PR. That is, if g is a conclusion of an extension and there exists a plan rule g → g′, then g′
should also be a conclusion of the same extension. Next definition states the closure of the set of plan rules of the agent.
Definition 22 (Closure of PR) Let F ⊆ B ∪A ∪ G ∪RESqua. The closure of F under the set PR of plan rules,
denoted by ClPR(F), is the smallest set such that:
• F ⊆ ClPR(F)
• If b1, ..., bn, g1, ..., gm, a1, ..., al, res_q(name, value)1, ..., res_q(name, value)k → g ∈ F and
b1, ..., bn, g1, ..., gm, a1, ..., al, res_q(name, value)1, ..., res_q(name, value)k ∈ ClPR(F) then
g ∈ ClPR(F).
If F = ClPR(F), then F is said to be closed under the set PR.
In our approach closure is important because it guarantees that all the goals that can be inferred from PR be evaluated
in terms of their possible conflicts, which in turn guarantees that the agent only will pursue non-conflicting goals.
Theorem 2 (Closure) Let PR be a set of plan rules, AF ′g be an argumentation framework built from PR. Output is
its set of justified conclusions, and E1, ..., En its extensions under the conflict-free semantics. AF ′g satisfies closure iff:
1. CONCS(Ei) = ClPR(CONCS(Ei)) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. Output = ClPR(Output).
The last property our proposal should satisfy is indirect consistency. This property means that (i) the closure under the
set of strict rules of the set of justified conclusions is consistent, and (ii) for each extension, the closure under the set of
strict rules of its conclusions is consistent.
Theorem 3 (Indirect consistency) Let PR be a set of plan rules, AF ′g = 〈Arg,Rg〉 be a general AF after consider-
ing the successful attacks. OUTPUT is its set of justified conclusions, and E1, ..., En its conflict-free extensions under the
conflict-free semantics. AF ′g = 〈Arg,Rg〉 satisfies indirect consistency iff:
1. ClPR(CONCS(Ei)) is consistent for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. ClPR (OUTPUT) is consistent.
9 Related Work
We can divide the related works into two groups, the first one contains works whose approaches are not based on
argumentation and the second one contains works that use argumentation to resolve the problem of goals selection. We
begin presenting the first group of works.
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One of the authors who has worked more on goals conflict – especially on conflict detection – is Thangarajah. In [11],
he and his partners propose a general framework for conflict detection and resolution. For the conflict detection, they
use a representation of the partial state of the world when each pursued goal is achieved, and by means of a mechanism
they determine whether there are possible worlds where these the partial states co-exist. The conflict resolution is based
on a preference ordering of the goals, which depends on both a priority-based commitment and an alternative-based
commitment. In [13], they focus specifically on resource conflict. They characterize different types of resources and
define resource requirements summaries. They also present mechanisms that allow agents to be aware of the possible
and necessary resource requirements. This information is then used to detect and avoid conflicts. Ultimately, in [12],
they propose a mechanism that allows agents to detect and avoid a particular kind of conflict between goals, in which
the achievement of a given goal undo conditions required for pursuing another goal. They use information about the
requirements and resulting effects of goals and their associated plans to calculate and generate interaction summaries
that let the agent schedule the execution of goals.
Other approaches worked on the selection strategy. Tinnemeier et al. [10] propose a mechanism to process incompatible
goals by refraining the agent from adopting plans for goals that hinder the achievement of goals the agent is currently
pursuing. They also define three types of goal selection strategies depending on the priority of the goals. Pokahr et
al. [15] propose a goal deliberation strategy called Easy Deliberation, which allows agent programmers to specify the
relationships between goals and enables an agent to deliberate about its goals by activating and deactivating certain
goals. Their strategy enforces that only conflict-free goals are pursued and considers the order of the goals depending
on their preference values. Wang et al. [16] proposes a runtime goal conflict resolution model for agent systems, which
consists of a goal state transition structure and a goal deliberation mechanism based on a extended event calculus.
Khan and Lespérance [14] present a framework where an agent can have multiple goals at different priority levels,
possibly inconsistent with each other. The information about the goals priority is used to decide which of them should
no longer be actively pursued in case they become mutually inconsistent. In their approach lower priority goals are not
dropped permanently when they are inconsistent with other goals but they become inactive ones. In this way, when the
world changes, the agent recomputes her adopted goals and some inactive goals may become active again. They argue
that this ensures that an agent maximizes her utility
Finaly, Zatelli et al. [17] propose an approach to handle conflicting goals. They consider the conflicts in the plan level.
In other words, they compare the plans that are used to achieve a given goal with the plans that are used to achieve
another goal. They propose a technique that breaks down the plans in several sub-plans and specify the conflict between
specific sub-plans. Regarding the detection of conflicts, it is performed based on explicitly information about conflicting
plans, which is introduced by the developer.
Next, we present the works that use argumentation techniques to resolve the problem of goals incompatibility.
In [25], Amgoud presents a framework for handling contradictory desires. This framework is based on actions, which
are defined as arguments. Thus, an action is made of a desire and a plan to achieve such desire. She defines four
causes that could originate the conflicts among actions: (i) inconsistent desires, (ii) inconsistent plans, (iii) inconsistent
consequences (it is referred to the consequences of performing an action), and (iv) inconsistency between a consequence
and a plan. She uses trees for delineating the actions and identifying the attacks. Finally, she redefines the notion of
defence and uses preferred extensions to return the different sets of desires that may be achieved together.
Hulstijn and van der Torre [27] propose an approach that is mainly based on the framework of Amgoud [25] with some
extensions. Like her, they use trees to represent the plans and work with the idea of conflicting actions in order to define
the attack between plans and unlike her, they do not change the notion of defence but the notion of attack and exclude
the possibility that their extensions contain two or more trees for the same desire.
The work of Atkinson and Bench-Capon [49] deserves a special mention. The authors address the problem of practical
reasoning based on presumptive argumentation using argument schemes and critical questions. Some of these critical
questions have to do with to the action selection stage, specifically two of these questions are directly related to conflicts
that may arise between actions. Such conflicts have similar characteristics than the terminal incompatibility and the
superfluity formalized in this work.
Lastly, Amgoud et al. [26] propose an argumentation system for practical reasoning. The proposed system is based
on constrained argumentation systems [50]. These systems extend the proposal of Dung [24] by adding constraints to
the arguments, which need to be satisfied by the extensions returned by the system. One part of their work focuses on
dealing with incompatibilities among plans, thus the possible conflicts arise when: (i) two plans cannot be executed at
the same time, (ii) the execution of two plans will lead to contradictory states of the world, and (iii) the execution of a
plan will prevent the execution of the second plan in the future. In order to deal with the conflicts they use e C-preferred
semantics and C-stable semantics [50].
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In this work, we focus basically on identifying conflicts between goals and on selecting the set of goals the agent will
pursue. We consider three forms of incompatibilities based on the theory introduced in [7]. Table 9 shows a summary
of all the related works along with their main characteristics; thus, column Topic indicates the problem (or problems)
that is (are) studied in the article, column Incompatibility specifies the kind of conflict that is addressed. Notice that in
most of the cases, this conflict is similar to the terminal incompatibility. The last column, Pref., indicates whether or not
the preference (or priority, or importance) is taken into account for the selection of goals.
Related work Topic Incompatibility Pref.
Thangarajah et al. [11] detection similar to terminal yes
selection •
Thangarajah et al. [13] detection resources not
avoiding applies
Thangarajah et al. [12] detection other not
avoiding applies
Tinnemeier et al. [10] avoiding similar to terminal yes
Pokahr et al. [15] selection not specified yes
Wang et al. [16] selection not specified not
Khan and Lespérance [14] selection not specified yes
Zatelli et al. [17] selection similar to terminal not
Amgoud [25] detection similar to terminal not
selection •
Hulstijn and van der Torre [27] detection similar to terminal not
selection superfluity
Amgoud et al. [26] detection similar to terminal not
selection •
Atkinson and Bench-Capon [49] detection similar to terminal not
similar to superfluity •
Rahwan and Amgoud [28] detection similar to terminal not
selection resources •
Table 2: Summary of the main related works along with the characteristics that will allow us to compare them with the
approach proposed in this article. Argumentation-based works are separated from the others by using a double line.
While it is true that most of the works focus on detecting and/or dealing with the problem of goals selection, we can
notice that some other works focus on avoiding this problem, which is another way of addressing this problem. Avoiding
a conflict is possible in some situation, for example, when the agent has a plan that is already being executed. In this
case, the plans of new activated goals can be compared with the plan that is being executed. However, there could be
other situations in which the agent needs to choose what goals he will pursue from a set of pursuble goals. We think
that both avoiding and selecting may be complementary in order to deal with the incompatibility problem. Therefore,
this is a good future direction of research.
Regarding the kinds of incompatibility the related works take into account. We notice that most of them consider a
kind of conflict very similar to the terminal incompatibility, only two works deal with the resource conflicts, and two
include a conflict similar to superfluity. With respect to the measure that allows defining an ordering of the goals, some
works use the preference, some others the priority and others the importance value. We can notice that the works based
on argumentation, unlike this work, do not use any of these measures. This has, in fact, an impact on the extensions
returned by the semantics and it is a clear difference of our work.
Next we make more detailed analisys of the similarities and differences between our work and the work of Rahwan and
Amgoud [28] since it is the closest related work to our approach.
Although we use the same tree structure of the instrumental arguments, we use additional elements in the body of the
plan rules. Thus, besides resources and goals, we also consider actions and beliefs. As stated in Table 2, they define a
set of conflicts that are similar to the notion of terminal incompatibility. For our part, we formalized a different form of
incompatibility named superfluity, which has a different nature than any other type of conflict defined for arguments;
however, in the domain of planning we consider that this is valid, as we explained in the corresponding section, and
also defined a conflict based on the availability of resources of the agent. Thus, the difference lies in the way we use the
knowledge about resources. In their case, they use it for determining a plan-plan conflict15, which is directly related to
15Given two partial plans [H,h] and [H ′, h′], a plan-plan conflict arises when H ∪H ′ `⊥.
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logical inconsistency. In our case, the resource conflict has no relation with classical logical inconsistency, but with the
amount of resources necessary for performing a plan and the availability of resources.
Regarding the strength calculation, we does not directly deal with measuring the strength of instrumental arguments;
however, we use the preference value of the goals as a kind of strength value in order to define the defeat relation
between arguments.
So far, some similarities and differences between our work and the work in [28] has been mentioned. However, the
main difference is related to the argumentative part of the work. Their proposal for obtaining the set of compatible
goals is done at plans level and is based on the notion of conflict-freeness, maximality and utility. In our proposal, we
also work at plans level and at goals level. At plans level, we also base on conflict-freeness, maximality and utility;
however, our notion of maximality is different. While they take as acceptable a set of conflict-free extensions that is
maximal for set inclusion, we take conflict-free extensions that maximize the number of achievable goals. We aim to
either maximize the number of achievable goals or to maximize the utility of the agent in terms of achieving the most
preferred goals, and the fact that a set of arguments is maximal for set inclusion does not necessarily imply that it will
allow the agent to achieve as many goals as possible.
10 Conclusions and Future Work
This work presents the formalization and identification of three forms of incompatibility between procedural goals.
We have noticed that the problem of selecting a set of compatible goals from a larger set of incompatible ones can be
compared to the problem of calculating an extension in abstract argumentation. Therefore, we have adapted concepts
of abstract argumentation to our problem. In this adaptation, it was also considered the notion of defeat or successful
attack since each goal has a different preference for the agent.
With respect to the research questions of the introduction, we can now state the following:
1. We have expressed a plan in terms of a instrumental argument, which is made up of a set of beliefs, actions,
resources, and sub-goals in its premise, which have to be true, performed, available, and achieved, respectively,
in order to the goal that is the claim of the argument. We defined different kinds of attacks according to the
form of incompatibility we wanted to identify. Therefore, the answer to our first research question is positive.
2. Both instrumental arguments and attacks are put together in argumentation frameworks. We defined one
argumentation framework for each form of incompatibility and a general argumentation framework that
involves all the all the kinds of attacks. Based on the general AF, we can identify when there is an attack
between two goals.
3. We also generated a new argumentation framework whose elements are the pursuable goals along with their
respective sub-goals. The attack relation is derived from the identification of attacks between arguments.
Besides, the preference of each goal is taken into account to break the symmetry of the relation, if possible.
Next we list some possible future research directions:
• As mentioned in Section 9, another way of dealing with incompatibility between goals is by avoiding it before
a goal becomes pursuable. It would be interesting to study if the proposed approach can be used in this
situation and how to integrate both forms of dealing with the problem.
• We have defined attacks between instrumental arguments. We could extend our approach by including other
kinds of attacks like the standard undercut and rebuttal.
• The preference value can be seen as a strength measure that determines what attack is successful; however,
there are other criteria that may be considered. Hence, the identification of these criteria and the study of how
to integrate them in order to determine the strength of an instrumental argument is another natural line of
research.
• The general AF can be seen as an expansion16 of the terminal, resource and superfluity AFs. A further analysis
is required to determine what kind of expansion it is and the properties it satisfies.
• According to van Riemsdijk et al. [53], the fact of including a temporal component in the representation of
goals could be a way of reducing inconsistency. More precisely, it would reduce what might appear to be an
inconsistency without considering the temporal information. For instance, consider goal be(fixed) and goal
clean(5, 5), suppose that the agent has a order for pursuing goals that states that be(fixed) has to be achieved
16More details about expansion theory can be found in [51] and [52].
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before clean(5, 5), no matter the type of failure of the robot. In this case, these two goals cannot be seen as
incompatible since the agent does not have to choose between them. Another example is when two goals have
to be achieved at different times. For instance, the agent has the goal of going to the maintenance service
on Saturday and has the goal of cleaning the room today. Although he is pursuing both goals, these are not
incompatible since they have to be achieved at different times. We can notice that temporal information may
in fact impact on the deliberation stage; therefore, it would be interesting to study how to include and use this
type of information in our proposal.
• For the identification of attacks between arguments we analize the whole tree of the argument; however, only
some parts of it may be analized if we consider that some sub-goals were already achieved. In such case, we
can denote these already achieved goals as beliefs. This will indeed be interesting, for example, in contexts
where replanning is necessary.
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A Proofs of Propositions and Theorems
Proposition 1 If (A,B) ∈ Rt, then (B,A) ∈ Rt.
Proof 1 By reduction ab absurbo. Assume that (B,A) /∈ Rt; hence, there
is no partial plan [H,ψ] ∈ SUPPORT(B) and there is no partial plan
[H ′, ψ′] ∈ SUPPORT(A) such that ψ = ¬′ψ. Based on this, we can say that ψ′ = ¬ψ does not hold either.
However, if ψ′ = ¬ψ does not hold, it means that argument A does not attack argument B either, and hence
(A,B) /∈ Rt, which contradicts the premise of the proposition. 
Proposition 2 If (A,B) ∈ Rr, then (B,A) ∈ Rr.
Proof 2 By reduction ab absurbo. Suppose that (B,A) /∈ Rr; hence, there is no resource res such that both
argument B and argument A need it. Based on this, we can say that argument A does not attack B either; therefore,
(A,B) /∈ Rr, which contradicts the premise of the proposition. 
Proposition 3 If (A,B) ∈ Rs, then (B,A) ∈ Rs.
Proof 3 We make a proof for each case:
• Case 1: By reduction ab absurbo. Assume that (B,A) /∈ Rs, then CLAIM(A) 6= CLAIM(B). This means that
(A,B) /∈ Rs, which contradicts the premise of the proposition.
• Case 2: By reduction ab absurbo. Assume that (B,A) /∈ Rs. Suppose that CLAIM(A) 6= CLAIM(B),
∃A′, B′ ∈ Arg such that [H ′′, CLAIM(A)] ∈ SUPPORT(A′) and [H ′′′, CLAIM(B)] ∈ SUPPORT(B′). Also
suppose that (B′, A′) /∈ Rs. Due to first case, we can say that (A′, B′) /∈ Rs, which means that (A,B) /∈ Rs.
This contradicts the premise of the proposition.
• Case 3: By reduction ab absurbo. Assume that (B,A) /∈ Rs. Suppose that CLAIM(A) 6= CLAIM(B),
∃A′ ∈ Arg such that [H ′′, CLAIM(A)] ∈ SUPPORT(A′). Also suppose that (B,A′) /∈ Rs. Due to first case,
we can say that (A′, B) /∈ Rs, which means that (A,B) /∈ Rs. This contradicts the premise of the proposition.

Proposition 4 If A ≡l A′ and B ≡l B′ then (A,B) ∈ Rx = (A′, B′) ∈ Rx (for x ∈ {t, s}).
Proof 4 For partial-plans rebuttal (Rt). Consider that (A,B) ∈ Rt, this means that there ex-
ists a partial plan [H,ψ] ∈ SUPPORT(A) and exists a partial plan [H ′, ψ′] ∈ SUPPORT(B)
such that HEAD([H,ψ]) = ¬HEAD([H ′, ψ′]). Due to the definition of logical equivalence, we can
say that given that SUPPORT(A) = SUPPORT(A′) then [H,ψ] ∈ SUPPORT(A′) and given that
SUPPORT(B) = SUPPORT(B′) then [H ′, ψ′] ∈ SUPPORT(B′). Therefore, we can say that (A′, B′) ∈ Rt.
For the superfluous attack (Rs). Let us present a proof for each case:
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• Case 1: Since A ≡l A′ and B ≡l B′, when we state that CLAIM(A′) = CLAIM(B′) is tantamount to saying
that CLAIM(A) = CLAIM(B) and when we state that SUPPORT(A′) 6= SUPPORT(B′) is tantamount to saying
that SUPPORT(A) 6= SUPPORT(B). Therefore, we can say that (A,B) ∈ Rs = (A′, B′) ∈ Rs.
• Case 2: Since A ≡l A′ and B ≡l B′ when we state that CLAIM(A′) 6= CLAIM(B′) is tantamount
to saying that CLAIM(A) 6= CLAIM(B). When we state that [H ′′, CLAIM(A′)] ∈ SUPPORT(A′′)
is tantamount to saying that [H ′′, CLAIM(A)] ∈ SUPPORT(A′′) and when we state that [H ′′′,
CLAIM(B′)] ∈ SUPPORT(B′′) is tantamount to saying that [H ′′′, CLAIM(B)]
∈ SUPPORT(B′′) where A′′, B′′ ∈ Arg are two arguments such that
(A′′, B′′) ∈ Rs due to the first case of superfluity. Therefore, we can say that (A,B) ∈ Rs = (A′, B′) ∈ Rs.
• Case 3: Since A ≡l A′ and B ≡l B′ when we state that CLAIM(A′) 6= CLAIM(B′) is tantamount to saying
that CLAIM(A) 6= CLAIM(B). When we state that [H ′′, CLAIM(A′)] ∈ SUPPORT(A′′) is tantamount to saying
that [H ′′, CLAIM(A)] ∈ SUPPORT(A′′) where A′′ ∈ Arg is an argument such that (A′′, B) ∈ Rs due to the
first case of superfluity. Therefore, we can say that (A,B) ∈ Rs = (A′, B′) ∈ Rs.
Due to Proposition 1 and Proposition 3, these proofs also hold for (B,A) ∈ Rx = (B′, A′) ∈ Rx.
Proposition 5 If A ≡r A′ and B ≡r B′ then (A,B) ∈ Rr = (A′, B′) ∈ Rr.
Proof 5 Let REC(A) be the resources necessary for performing the plan represented by argument A and REC(B) be the
resources necessary for performing the plan represented by argument B. Given that A ≡r A′ and B ≡r B′, it means
that REC(A) = REC(B).
Since (A,B) ∈ Rr, it means that ∃res_q(name, value) ∈ BODY([H,φ]) –where [H,φ] ∈ SUPPORT(A)–
and ∃res_q(name, value)′ ∈ BODY([H ′, φ′]) –where [H ′, φ′] ∈ SUPPORT(B)– such that RESsum 0r
(res_q(name, value) ∧ res_q(name, value)′). Considering that both resources res_q(name, value) and
res_q(name, value)′ are also part of the supports of arguments A′ and B′, we can say that (A,B) ∈ Rr =
(A′, B′) ∈ Rr.
Due to Proposition 2, this proof also hold for (B,A) ∈ Rr = (B′, A′) ∈ Rr.
Proposition 6 If A ≡w A′ and B ≡w B′ then (A,B) ∈ Rx=(A′, B′) ∈ Rx (for x ∈ {t, s, r}).
Proof 6 This follows directly from the proofs of propositions 4 and 5. 
Proposition 7 If (A,B) ∈ Rr and A ≡r A′ then (A′, B) ∈ Rr.
Proof 7 Since (A,B) ∈ Rr, it means that ∃res_q(name, value) ∈ BODY([H,φ]) –where [H,φ] ∈
SUPPORT(A)– and ∃res_q(name, value)′ ∈ BODY([H ′, φ′]) –where [H ′, φ′] ∈ SUPPORT(B)– such that
RESsum 0r (res_q(name, value) ∧ res_(name, value)′). Consider that ∃(res_q(name, value)1 ∈
BODY([H,φ]′) – where [H,φ]′ ∈ SUPPORT(A′). Due to resource equivalence definition, we
can say that res_q(name, value)1 = res_q(name, value). Therefore, (A′, B) ∈ Rr.

Proposition 8 If (A,B) ∈ Rx and A ≡l A′ then (A′, B) ∈ Rx (for x ∈ {t, s}).
Proof 8 For the partial-plans rebuttal (Rt). By reduction ab absurbo. Consider that there is no partial-plans rebuttal
relation between A′ and B; hence, we can say that SUPPORT(A′) ∪ SUPPORT(B) 0⊥. Since A′ ≡ A, it means that
SUPPORT(A′) = SUPPORT(A). Based on this, we can say that SUPPORT(A) ∪ SUPPORT(B) 0⊥, which means that
there is no partial-plans rebuttal relation between A and B. This contradicts the premise that there is an attack relation
between arguments A and B.
For the superfluous attack (Rs). Let us present a proof for each case. Firstly, let A′′, B′′ ∈ Arg be two arguments such
that (A′′, B′′) ∈ Rs due to the first case of superfluity.
• Case 1: Since (A,B) ∈ Rs and A ≡l A′, we can say that CLAIM(A′) = CLAIM(B) and SUPPORT(A′) 6=
SUPPORT(B). Therefore, we can say that (A′, B) ∈ Rs.
• Case 2: Since (A,B) ∈ Rs andA ≡l A′ we can say that CLAIM(A′) 6= CLAIM(B). Consider that ∃A′′, B′′ ∈
Arg such that (A′′, B′′) ∈ Rs due to the first case of superfluity. Also consider that [H ′′, CLAIM(A′)] ∈
SUPPORT(A′′) and [H ′′, CLAIM(B)] ∈ SUPPORT(B′′). Therefore, we can say that (A′, B) ∈ Rs.
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• Case 3: Since (A,B) ∈ Rs and A ≡l A′ we can say that CLAIM(A′) 6= CLAIM(B). Consider that ∃A′′ ∈
Arg such that (A′′, B) ∈ Rs due to the first case of superfluity. Also consider that that [H ′′, CLAIM(A′)] ∈
SUPPORT(A′′) and [H ′′, CLAIM(A′)] /∈ SUPPORT(B). Therefore, we can say that (A′, B) ∈ Rs.
Proposition 9 If (A,B) ∈ Rx and A ≡w A′ then (A′, B) ∈ Rx, for x ∈ {t, r, s}.
Proof 9 This follows directly from the proofs of propositions 7 and 8. 
Proposition 10 If (A,B) ∈ Rt, then ∃[H,ψ] ∈ SUPPORT(A) and ∃[H ′, ψ′] ∈ SUPPORT(B) such that HEAD([H,ψ]) ∪
HEAD([H ′, ψ′]) `⊥.
Proof 10 This follows directly from the fact that in the attack defined for terminal incompatibility, i.e., partial-plans
rebuttal, HEAD([H,ψ]) = ¬HEAD([H ′, ψ′]). Therefore, the union of both produces a contradiction. 
Proposition 11 Let g, g′ ∈ G ′, ARG(g) and ARG(g′) be the sets of arguments whose claims are g and g′, respectively. If
∃A ∈ ARG(g) and ∃B ∈ ARG(g′) such that A and B are conflict-free, then (g, g′), (g′, g) 6∈ RG.
Proof 11 Suppose that all the arguments of ARG(g) and ARG(g′) have a conflict relation except arguments A and B,
because they are conflict-free. This means that the conflict-free semantics returns an extension whose elements are argu-
ments A and B: SCF = {{A,B}}. We then apply function COMP_GOALS in order to obtain the set of compatible goals:
COMP_GOALS({A,B}) = {g, g′}. Since g and g′ are compatible, it means that there is no attack relation between them.
Theorem 1 (Direct consistency) Let AF ′g = 〈Arg,Rg〉 be a general AF and E1, ..., En its conflict-free extensions.∀Ei, i = 1, ..., n, it holds that:
1. The set of beliefs BEL(Ei) is a consistent set of literals.
2. The set of actions ACT(Ei) is a consistent set of literals.
3. The set of goals GOA(Ei) is a consistent set of literals.
4. The set of resources REC(E) is a resource-consistent subset ofRESqua.
5. The set of goals GOA(Ei) has no superfluous conflicting goals.
Proof 12 Let Ei be an extension of AF ′g .
1. Let us show that BEL(Ei) is a consistent set of literals.
Suppose that BEL(Ei) is inconsistent. This means that ∃ b,¬b ∈ BEL(Ei). Consider that ∃ A,B ∈ Ei such that
it happens that [{}, b] ∈ SUPPORT(A) and [{},¬b] ∈ SUPPORT(B). This means that there is a partial-plans
rebuttal between A and B due to b and ¬b. Since it contradicts the fact that Ei is conflict-free, we can say that
BEL(Ei) is consistent.
2. Let us show that ACT(Ei) is a consistent set of literals.
Suppose that ACT(Ei) is inconsistent. This means that ∃ a,¬a ∈ BEL(Ei). Consider that ∃ A,B ∈ Ei such that
it happens that [{}, a] ∈ SUPPORT(A) and [{},¬a] ∈ SUPPORT(B). This means that there is a partial-plans
rebuttal between A and B due to a and ¬a. Since it contradicts the fact that Ei is conflict-free, we can say that
ACT(Ei) is consistent.
3. Let us show that GOA(Ei) is a consistent set of literals.
Suppose that GOA(Ei) is inconsistent. This means that ∃ g,¬g ∈ SUB(Ei). Consider that ∃ A,B ∈ Ei such that
it happens that [{}, g] ∈ SUPPORT(A) and [{},¬g] ∈ SUPPORT(B). This means that there is a partial-plans
rebuttal between A and B due to g and ¬g. Since it contradicts the fact that Ei is conflict-free, we can say that
GOA(Ei) is consistent.
4. Let us show that REC(Ei) is a resource-consistent subset ofRESqua.
Suppose that REC(Ei) is resource-inconsistent. This means that
∃ res_q(name, value)A, res_q(name, value)B ∈ REC(Ei) such that RESsum 0r
(res_q(name, value)A ∧ res_q(name, value)B). This in turn means that ∃ A,B ∈ Ei such that
there is a resource attack between A and B. This contradicts the fact that Ei is conflict-free and therefore, we
can say that REC(Ei) is a resource-consistent.
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5. Let us show that GOA(Ei) has no superfluous conflicting goals.
Suppose that ∃g, g′ ∈ GOA(Ei) such that g and g′ are superfluous goals. Let us analize each case of the
superfluous attack:
• Case 1: Since g and g′ are superfluous goals, it means that ∃A,B ∈ Ei such that CLAIM(A) =
CLAIM(B) = g = g′ and SUPPORT(A) 6= SUPPORT(B). Hence, there is a superfluous attack between A
and B. This contradicts the fact that Ei is conflict free.
• Case 2: Given that g, g′ ∈ GOA(Ei), it means that ∃C,D ∈ Ei such that CLAIM(C) = g and CLAIM(D) =
g′. Consider now that ∃g′′ ∈ GOA(Ei) and ∃A ∈ Ei such that CLAIM(A) = g′′. Also consider that
∃B ∈ Arg such that B /∈ Ei because CLAIM(B) = CLAIM(A) and SUPPORT(A) 6= SUPPORT(B), which
means that there is a superfluous attack between A and B. Since g and g′ are superfluous goals, it means
that g 6= g′, g ∈ BODY(SUPPORT(A)) and g′ ∈ BODY(SUPPORT(B)). Thus, we can say that there is a
superfluous attacks between C and D, which contradicts the fact that Ei is conflict free.
• Case 3: Given that g, g′ ∈ GOA(Ei), it means that ∃C,B ∈ Ei such that CLAIM(C) = g and CLAIM(B) =
g′. Consider now that ∃A ∈ Arg such thatA /∈ Ei because CLAIM(A) = CLAIM(B) and SUPPORT(A) 6=
SUPPORT(B), which means that there is a superfluous attack between A and B. Since g and g′ are
superfluous goals, it means that g 6= g′, g ∈ BODY(SUPPORT(A)) and g /∈ BODY(SUPPORT(B)). Thus,
we can say that there is a superfluous attacks between C and B, which contradicts the fact that Ei is
conflict free.
Finally, since all the extensions obtained from AF are consistent, then OUTPUT is also consistent. 
Theorem 2 (Closure) Let PR be a set of plan rules, AF ′g be an argumentation framework built from PR. Output is
its set of justified conclusions, and E1, ..., En its extensions under the conflict-free semantics. AF ′g satisfies closure iff:
1. CONCS(Ei) = ClPR(CONCS(Ei)) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. Output = ClPR(Output).
Proof 13 Let us call ArgCl the arguments that can be built from BEL(E) ∪ ACT(E) ∪ GOA(E) ∪ REC(E).
Given that CONCS(Ei) = ClPR(CONCS(Ei)), we will proof that ∀Ei, i = 1, ..., n, it holds that Ei = ArgCl; thus, we
will first proof that Ei ⊆ ArgCl and then that ArgCl ⊆ Ei.
1. Ei ⊆ ArgCl: This is trivial.
2. ArgCl ⊆ Ei: Suppose that ArgCl * Ei; hence, ∃A ∈ ArgCl such that A 6∈ Ei. Since A 6∈ Ei, it means that
∃B ∈ Ei such that (B,A) ∈ Rg or (A,B) ∈ Rg. There are three situation in which this happens, one for
each form of incompatibility:
(a) When the attack is a partial-plans rebuttal ((B,A) ∈ Rt or (A,B) ∈ Rt): This means that ∃[H,ψ] ∈
SUPPORT(B) and ∃[H ′, ψ′] ∈ SUPPORT(A) such that ψ = ¬ψ′, considering that ψ,ψ′ ∈ B or ψ,ψ′ ∈ G
or ψ,ψ′ ∈ A. Since both A and B are built from BEL(Ei), ACT(Ei), and GOA(Ei) this would mean that
BEL(Ei), ACT(Ei), or GOA(Ei) are inconsistent, which contradicts the first, second, and third items of
Theorem 1.
(b) When it is a resource attack ((B,A) ∈ Rr or (A,B) ∈ Rr): Let
res_q(name, value)A, res_q(name, value)B ∈ RESqua. Consider that ∃[H,ψ] ∈ SUPPORT(B)
and ∃[H ′, ψ′] ∈ SUPPORT(A). Also consider that ∃res_q(name, value)B ∈ BODY([H,ψ]) and
∃res_q(name, value)A ∈ SUPPORT([H ′, ψ′]) such that RESsum 0r (res_q(name, value)B ∧
res_q(name, value)A). Therefore, there is a resource attack between A and B. Since the resources for
building A and B are part of REC(Ei), this would mean that REC(Ei) is resource-inconsistent, which
contradicts the forth item of Theorem 1.
(c) When it is a superfluous attack ((B,A) ∈ Rs or (A,B) ∈ Rs): Let g = CLAIM(A) and g′ = CLAIM(B).
Since there is a superfluous attack between A and B, it means that g and g′ are superfluous goals.
Given that both arguments are built from BEL(Ei), ACT(Ei), REC(Ei), and GOA(Ei), we can say that their
conclusions are also part of GOA(Ei), i.e. g, g′ ∈ GOA(Ei). This contradicts the last item of Theorem 1,
which proofs that there is no superfluous conflicting goals in GOA(Ei).
Theorem 3 (Indirect consistency) Let PR be a set of plan rules,AF ′g = 〈Arg,Rg〉 be a general AF. OUTPUT is its set
of justified conclusions, and E1, ..., En its conflict-free extensions under the conflict-free semantics. AF ′g = 〈Arg,Rg〉
satisfies indirect consistency iff:
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1. ClPR(CONCS(Ei)) is consistent for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. ClPR (OUTPUT) is consistent.
Proof 14 Based on Proposition 7 defined in [29]17, we can say that our proposal satisfies indirect inconsistency since
it satisfies closure and direct consistency.
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